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In European Welfare States, low-skilled workers are typically unionized, while the wage 
formation of high-skilled workers is more competitive. To focus on this aspect, we analyze 
how flexible international outsourcing and labour taxation affect wage formation, 
employment and welfare in dual domestic labour markets. Higher productivity of outsourcing, 
lower cost of outsourcing and lower factor price of outsourcing increase wage dispersion 
between the high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Increasing wage tax progression of low-
skilled workers decreases the wage rate and increases the labour demand of low-skilled 
workers. It decreases the welfare of low-skilled workers and increases both the welfare of 
high-skilled workers and the profit of firms. 
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I.     Introduction 
    
European Welfare States are characterized by dual labour markets. Low-skilled 
workers are typically unionized, while high-skilled workers often negotiate on their 
wages individually, and, thus, face more competitive wage formation. Historically, 
labour unions have been able to push for relatively high wages of low-skilled workers, 
at the cost of a higher unemployment in Continental Europe than in the United States 
(see e.g. Freeman and Schettkat (2001)). During the late 20
th century and this decade, 
globalization has put the European welfare  model under increasing pressure. Wage 
differences across countries constitute a central explanation for the increasing dominant 
business practice of international outsourcing across a wide range of industries (see e.g. 
Sinn (2007) for an overview and Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy 
of outsourcing).
1  
When outsourcing and domestic labour are substitutes, the demand for domestic 
homogenous labour is decreasing and its wage elasticity is increasing in the share of 
outsourcing (see e.g. Senses (2006) for empirical evidence). This limits the mark-up 
trade unions can set above the opportunity cost of labour. Outsourcing can take two 
alternative forms. Firms may write long-term contracts that fix the amount of 
outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage, i.e. strategic outsourcing, or 
alternatively firms may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing 
activity simultaneously with domestic labour demand after the domestic wage is set by 
the trade union. In the case of homogenous domestic labour the impacts of labour tax 
policy reforms have been analyzed in Koskela and Schöb (2008) both in the case of 
strategic and flexible outsourcing.  
We analyze the effects of international outsourcing and wage taxation on dual 
domestic labour markets by assuming that the low-skilled workers are unionized, while 
the wages of high-skilled workers are determined competitively.
2 In Koskela and 
                                                 
1       Moreover, Amiti and Wei (2005) as well as Rishi and Saxena (2004) emphasize the big difference 
in labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both 
manufacturing and services to countries with low labour costs. 
2       There are some papers that analyze the effects of outsourcing when labour is heterogeneous, like 
Davidson et al. (2007) and Davidson et al. (2008). However, these papers analyze labour market 
frictions that arise with search, while we focus on the role of labour unions. Importantly, the   2
Poutvaara (2008) we have assumed that outsourcing in this kind of dual domestic 
labour markets is strategic, but now we study how flexible outsourcing and labour 
taxation affect wage formation, employment and welfare in dual domestic labour 
markets. We use a production function where outsourcing is complementary for 
domestic high-skilled labour and substitutable to domestic low-skilled labour.  
We show that in the presence of flexible outsourcing the own wage elasticity 
and the cross wage elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand depend negatively on 
the cost of outsourcing, and on the factor price of outsourcing and positively on the 
payroll tax, and the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity for the high-
skilled labour demand are independent of the cost of outsourcing and the payroll tax. 
We also find that the outsourcing elasticities are constant with respect to the low-skilled 
wage, the payroll tax, the productivity of outsourcing and the cost of outsourcing. 
When the high-skilled wage adjusts to equalize labour demand and labour supply, the 
high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-skilled wage and the payroll tax. The 
high-skilled wage is independent of the high-skilled wage tax parameters in the case of 
high-skilled workers’ Cobb-Douglas utility function. Moreover, the high-skilled wage 
depends on the cost of outsourcing and of the productivity of outsourced production 
indirectly, through its effect on low-skilled wage. The reason for this is that high-skilled 
and low-skilled labour are complements, so that low-skilled wage affects how much 
low-skilled labour input firms want to employ. However, there is no direct link from 
outsourcing cost and outsourcing productivity parameters to high-skilled wage.  
In the presence of flexible outsourcing the lower cost of outsourcing, the lower 
factor price of outsourcing and the higher productivity of outsourced production will 
decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour and increase the wage for the high-skilled 
labour, thereby inducing higher wage dispersion. The higher low-skilled wage tax rate 
will increase the wage for the low-skilled labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled 
labour and the higher low-skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the wage for the 
low-skilled labour and will increase the wage for the high-skilled labour.  Similar 
                                                                                                                                              
effects of labour taxation may differ even qualitatively between models with labour unions and 
with search related employment (see e.g. Pissarides (1998) concerning the analysis of this issue in 
the absence of outsourcing).   3
qualitative effects arise in the absence of outsourcing. With flexible outsourcing, the 
higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-skilled and high-
skilled labour. In the absence of outsourcing, the higher payroll tax for the firms will 
decrease the wage for the high-skilled labour, but has no effect on the wage of low-
skilled labour. 
Increasing the wage tax and the tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to 
keep the relative burden per worker constant implies a higher degree of tax progression. 
This will decrease the wage rate and increase labour demand of low-skilled workers, 
while it will have no effect on the labour demand of high-skilled workers. 
Corresponding effects arise in the absence of outsourcing. We show that a higher 
degree of tax progression for low-skilled workers will decrease the welfare of low-
skilled workers and increase the welfare of high-skilled workers. Also the profits of 
firms increase. 
We proceed as follows: Section II presents the time sequence of the decisions 
regarding some policy issues associated with labour taxes, wage setting for domestic 
low-skilled workers, labour demand for domestic high-skilled and low skilled workers, 
outsourcing and wage setting for high-skilled workers. We study the segmented 
domestic labour demand for heterogenous work force and outsourcing decision and 
wage formation of high-skilled workers due to market equilibrium under labour 
taxation in section III. Wage formation by the monopoly labour union for low-skilled 
workers under a linearly progressive wage tax levied on workers and a proportional 
payroll tax levied on firms is analyzed in section IV. In section V we study the impacts 
of low-skilled wage progression on employment, welfare and profits.  Finally, we 
summarize conclusions in section VI.    
 
 
II.  Basic Framework 
 
We analyze a model with heterogeneous domestic workers and international 
outsourcing. The production combines labour services by high-skilled workers and low-
skilled workers. Low-skilled labour services can be provided either by the firm’s own 
workers, or obtained from abroad through international outsourcing. We assume that   4
the firms may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity 
only after the wage is set by the trade union. The time sequence for this case is 
described by Figure 1.   
 
                stage 1              stage 2                            stage 3                                                                     




              tax policy      low-skilled wage           high-skilled and low-skilled  
  decisions       by labour union            labour demand, outsourcing decision,                                     
                                                               high-skilled labour supply and                   
                 high-skilled wage  
                                  
       Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
 
The government sets its policy at stage 1. At stage 2 conditional on policy 
choices by the government, the labour union determines the wage for the low-skilled 
workers by taking into account how this affects the demand for labour and outsourcing 
by the firms. We assume that there are many industries, so that each labour union 
represents only a small fraction of the total labor force. At stage 3, firms decide on 
domestic employment and international outsourcing. The wages of the high-skilled 
labour adjust to equalize labour demand and labour supply. The decisions at each stage 
are analyzed by using backward induction.    5
 
 
III.  Labour Demand, Outsourcing Decisions and High-Skilled Wage 
Formation 
 
III.1.   Labour Demand and Outsourcing 
 
At the last stage, the firm decides on the high-skilled labour demand H , the 
low-skilled labour demand L and outsourcing M in order to maximize the profit 
function 
 
         ) ( ~ ~ ) , , (
) , , (
M g M w L w H w M L H F Max M L H
M L H
− − − − = π 3 2 1                                 (1)                     
 
When deciding on its labour demand and outsourcing, each firm takes as given the 
gross wage for high-skilled labour,  ) 1 ( ~ s w w H H + = , and the gross wage for low-skilled 
labour,  ) 1 ( ~ s w w L L + = , where s is the proportional payroll tax levied on the firm. In 
order to obtain M  units of outsourced low-skilled labour input, we assume that firms 
acquire the low-skilled labour input at the factor price  M w  and also firms have to spend 
2 5 , 0 ) ( cM M g =  with  0 ) ( ' > = cM M g  and  0 ) ( ' ' > = c M g  to establish the capacity for 
foreign outsourcing concerning the network of suppliers in the relevant low-wage 
countries. 
We follow Koskela and Stenbacka (2007) by assuming a general and reasonable 
Cobb-Douglas-type production function with decreasing returns to scale according to 
three labour inputs, i.e.   [ ]
ρ
γ
a a M L H M L H F
− + =
1 ) ( ) , , ( , where the parameters ρ  and 
a are assumed to satisfy the following assumptions :  1 0 < < ρ  and  1 0 < < a . The 
parameter  0 > γ  captures the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input 
relative to the domestic low-skilled labour input. The marginal products of high-skilled 
labour,  low-skilled labour and outsourcing are: 
a a
H M L aH Y F
− − − + =
1 1 1 ) ( γ ρ
ρ ,   6
a a
L M L a H Y F
− − + − = ) )( 1 (
1 γ ρ
ρ , and  L
a a
M F M L a H Y F γ γ ρ γ
ρ = + − =
− − ) )( 1 (
1  
respectively, where 
a a M L H Y
− + =
1 ) ( γ . The outsourced low-skilled labour input 
affects the marginal products of the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labour inputs 
as follows:  
 
             0 ) ( ) 1 (
1 1 2 > + − =
− − − a a
HM M L a aH Y F γ γ ρ
ρ                                                       (2a)       
                  [ ] 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) 1 (
1 1 < − − + − − =
− − − a M L a H Y F
a a
LM ρ γ γ ρ
ρ .                                     (2b)                                
 
For this production function the domestic high-skilled labour input and the outsourced 
low-skilled labour input are complements, whereas the low-skilled domestic labour 
input and the outsourced low-skilled labour input are substitutes in terms of the 
marginal product effects of outsourcing. Also one can calculate from the production 
function that the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labour are complements, i.e. 
0 > HL F . Given the wages, the outsourcing cost function and the tax parameters the 
first-order conditions characterizing the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labour 
demands and outsourcing are  
     
     [] 0 ~ ) ( ) (
1 1 1 1 = − + + =
− − − −
H
a a a a
H w M L aH M L H γ γ ρ π
ρ                                 (3a) 
 
      [] 0 ~ ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
1 1 = − + − + =
− − −
L
a a a a
L w M L H a M L H γ λ ρ π
ρ                               (3b) 
 
      [] 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
1 1 = − − + − + =
− − − cM w M L H a M L H M
a a a a
M γ γ λ ρ π
ρ
.                  (3c)  
 
These first-order conditions imply the following relationship between the high-skilled 
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Using (3b) and (3c) we have    7
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c M M M w c M . 
According to (5) optimal flexible outsourcing requires that  M L w s w > + ) 1 ( γ  so that 
factor price of outsourcing should be smaller than the gross factor price of domestic 
low-skilled labour multiplied by the relative productivity of outsourcing. Higher low-
skilled domestic wage rate, higher payroll tax and higher productivity of outsourced 
labour input, lower outsourcing cost and lower factor price of outsourcing will increase 
outsourcing.    
Substituting the RHS of (4) into (3b) gives (see Appendix A) the low-skilled 
labour demand, which can be expressed as follows 
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H , which are the 
own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour in the 
absence of outsourcing .
3  These are higher with weaker decreasing returns to scale. In 
the absence of outsourcing the payroll tax elasticity of the low-skilled labour is 
1
1









s Ls  because of the decreasing returns to scale. According to (6), 
a more extensive outsourcing activity will decrease the low-skilled labour demand. This 
                                                 
3       In the presence of perfect substitutability between two types of labour inputs, i.e. between L  and  
M , we would have  1 = γ . However, qualitative results would be similar.    8
feature is consistent with empirical evidence.
4 In the presence of outsourcing the wage 
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follows  
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Concerning these wage elasticities we find that 






































































 so that when outsourcing will 
change, the own wage and cross wage elasticities of the low-skilled labour demand 
increase. These are in conformity with empirical evidence.
5 Differentiating (7a) with 
respect to s gives  
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so that the payroll tax in the presence of outsourcing will have a positive effect on the 
wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour demand. Comparative statics is qualitatively 
similar in terms of 
f
H η , but there is no wage elasticity effect of payroll tax in the 
                                                 
4        For  instance  Diehl  (1999) has presented empirical evidence from German manufacturing 
industries in support of this hypothesis. Moreover, Görg and Hanley (2005) have used plant-level 
data of the Irish electronic sector to empirically conclude that international outsourcing reduces 
plant-level labour demand.    
5        Senses (2006) has provided empirical evidence according to which a production mode with more 
ttoutsourcing seems to increase the wage elasticity of labour demand. Also Slaughter (2001) and 
Hasan et al. (2007) have shown that international trade has increased the wage elasticity of labour 
demand.   9










. In the presence of flexible outsourcing the 
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so that higher outsourcing raises this elasticity as well. The effect of outsourcing cost 
on the wage elasticity of low-skilled labour is  
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so that lower outsourcing cost will increase wage elasticity of domestic low-skilled 
labour demand. Also one can show that higher outsourcing productivity will increase 






L . The effect of factor price of outsourcing on the wage 
elasticity of low-skilled labour is  
   10
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Of course, lower factor price of outsourcing will increase the wage elasticity of 
domestic low-skilled labour demand. 
Finally, substituting the RHS of equation (6) into the relationship in equation (4) 
gives the following demand for the high-skilled labour 
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s Hs . These elasticities are also higher with weaker decreasing 
returns to scale, but unlike in the case with the low-skilled labour, both the own wage 
and cross wage labor demand elasticities, and the payroll tax elasticity for the high-
skilled labour are independent of outsourcing. The higher own wage, cross wage and 
payroll tax will of course affect negatively the high-skilled labour demand.  
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the domestic 
labour demand as follows. 
 
Proposition 1 In the presence of flexible outsourcing    11
(a) both the own wage and the cross wage elasticities for the low-skilled 
labour demand depend negatively on the cost of outsourcing and factor 
price of outsourcing, and positively on the payroll tax, and  
(b) both the own wage and the cross wage elasticities for the high-skilled 
labour demand are independent of the cost of outsourcing and the payroll 
tax.  
 
Proposition 1 reveals an asymmetry in how the demand for high-skilled and low-skilled 
labor react to the cost of outsourcing and the level of payroll taxes. An increase in 
outsourcing cost or payroll tax would increase the own wage elasticity, and the cross 
wage elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand, while having no effect on the 
elasticities for the high-skilled labour demand.  
 
III.2.   Wage Formation for High-Skilled Workers  
 
III.2.1 Optimal Labour Supply of High-Skilled Workers 
 
We assume that the market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage  H w  follows 
from the equality of labour demand and the labour supply by using the case of Cobb-
Douglas (C-D) utility function, so that the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure is one. First we derive labour supply and after that the wage 
formation from market equilibrium by taking the low-skilled wage  L w  as given.              
We assume that the government can employ the proportional wage tax  H t  for 
high-skilled worker, which is levied on the wage rate  H w  minus tax exemption  H e . 
Thus the total tax base in this case is  H e w H H ) ( − , where H  is labour supply. In the 
presence of positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax 
rate  ) / 1 ( H H H w e t −  so that the system is linearly progressive.
6 The net-of-tax wage, the 
high-skilled worker receives, is  H H H H H e t w t w + − = ) 1 ( ˆ . 
                                                 
6     For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another 
elaboration, see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).       12
Labour supply of the high-skilled worker is determined by utility maximization. 
In the case of the C-D utility function maximizing 
μ μ − − =
1 ) 1 ( ) , ( H C H C U ,  1 0 < < μ , 
s.t.  C H wH = ˆ  with respect to labour supply H  gives 
0 ) 1 ( ) ˆ )( 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( ) ˆ (
1 1 = − − − − =
− − − μ μ μ μ μ μ H H w w H H w U H H H H  so that  
 
                      μ =
s H                                                                                               (13) 
 
Therefore under this assumption the net-of-tax wage  H H H H H e t w t w + − = ) 1 ( ˆ  will have 
no effect on labour supply when the substitution and income effects of wage rate cancel 
each other. It is important to emphasize that a central finding in the empirical labour 
market literature is that labour supply tends to be quite unresponsive along the intensive 
margin (see for empirical evidence, e.g. Immervoll et al (2007) and Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999)). Therefore, we focus on this finding concerning the market 
equilibrium of high-skilled workers. 
 
III.2.2 Market Equilibrium for High-Skilled Wage Formation   
 
Unlike in the case of low-skilled workers we assume that the high-skilled wage 
H w  is determined by the market equilibrium concerning the equality of the labour 
demand function and the labour supply function. In the case of C-D utility function the 
equality 
s H H =
*  gives  μ
ε ε ε = +
−
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ε ε . The comparative statics  
in terms of  L w  is    
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Equation (15) lies in conformity with empirics concerning the negative relationship 
between high-skilled and low-skilled wages.
7  The effect of payroll tax on the wage rate 
of high-skilled workers is    
                     0
1
) 1 (






































              (16)                        
     
so that higher payroll tax will decrease the wage rate of high-skilled workers because it 
decreases labour demand given the labour supply (concerning empirical evidence, see. 
e.g. Daveri and Tabellini (2000), and Bingley and Lanot (2002)). According to (13) the 
high-skilled wage rate does not depend on the outsourcing cost and the productivity of 
outsourcing.      
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the high-skilled 
wage determination in the presence of outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 2 In the presence of flexible outsourcing   
(a) the high-skilled wage depends negatively  on the low-skilled wage and  the 
payroll tax, but is independent of the high-skilled wage tax parameters in 
the case of high-skilled workers’ Cobb-Douglas utility function, and    
      (b)    the high-skilled wage is also directly independent of the cost of 
outsourcing and the productivity of outsourcing, but depends indirectly on 
the low-skilled wage change and the productivity of the low-skilled wage 
change so that higher outsourcing cost will decrease, while higher 
productivity of low-skilled labour input relative to the domestic labour 
input  will increase the high-skilled wage. 
 
                                                 
7       See evidence from various countries which lies in conformity with this, e.g. Braun and Scheffel 
(2007), Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2001), Hijzen et al (2005), Hijzen (2007), Egger and Egger 
(2006), Munch and Skaksen (2005), Riley and Young (2007) and Geishecker and Görg (2008).   14
In the first sight, it may appear surprising that the high-skilled wage reacts negatively to 
the low-skilled wage tax, but is independent of their own wage tax. The intuition for 
this relies on our assumption that the high-skilled workers have a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. With it, income and substitution effects of a tax increase on the labor supply 
cancel each other out. 
 
 
IV.  Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union  
 
Now we analyze the wage formation of low-skilled workers so that it takes 
place in anticipation of optimal labour and outsourcing decisions by the firm. We 
analyze the wage formation by the monopoly union (see also Cahuc and Zylberberg 
(2004), p. 401-403 concerning the monopoly union specification), which determines the 
wage for low-skilled workers in anticipation of optimal in-house low-skilled labour 
demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing determined simultaneously and of 
market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage  H w .
8   
 
IV.1.   Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labour Union 
 
We investigate the wage formation by monopoly labour union when there is 
proportional payroll tax, and the linearly progressive wage tax for low-skilled workers. 
The market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage  H w  follows from the equality of 
labour demand and the labour supply by focusing the case of C-D utility function. The 
monopoly labour union determines the wage for low-skilled workers in anticipation of 
optimal domestic labour demand and outsourcing decisions by the firm. We assume 
that government can employ a proportional tax rate  L t , which is levied on the wage rate 
L w  minus a tax exemption e, i.e. the total tax base is 
* ) ( L e wL− . In the presence of a 
positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax rate 
                                                 
8   In Western European countries, which we like to focus, labour market institutions are close to this 
(see e.g. Freeman (2008)).  
   15
) / 1 ( L L w e t −  so that the system is linearly progressive and the net-of-tax wage is 
e t w t w L L L L + − = ) 1 ( ˆ .  
  The objective function of the labour union is assumed to be 
N b L b w N b L b e t w t V L L L L L L L L + − = + − + − =
* * ) ˆ ( ) ) 1 (( , where  L b  is the (exogenous) 
outside option available to the low-skilled workers and N is the number of labour union 
members. The monopoly labour union sets wage for the low-skilled workers so as to 
maximize the surplus according to  
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  (see equations (12), (13) and (14)).  
The first-order condition associated with (17) is  
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and this can be written as follows   
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H γ ε η . These low-skilled labour 


































− − − γ
ε ε ε  
depends negatively on the following variables: the high-skilled wage, the low-skilled 
wage, the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input relative to the 
domestic low-skilled labour input, and the payroll tax and positively on the cost of 
outsourcing and the factor price of outsourcing.    
Equation (19) can be expressed as follows   
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ˆ .  Therefore we have (see Appendix B)  
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so that the total wage elasticity also allowing for the relationship between high-skilled 
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γ . It is important to emphasize that 
the optimal low-skilled wage (21) even in the case of the monopoly labour union is an 
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IV.2.   Comparative Statics of Wage Formation  
 
In order to characterize the effect of outsourcing cost on the low-skilled wage 
formation we therefore apply the implicit differentiation. Differentiating the wage 
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(see equation (10)),  and 
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 the relationship between the low-skilled wage formation and outsourcing  cost can be 
written as follows 
       


































                                                                    (23) 
 
so that higher (lower) outsourcing cost will increase (decrease) the wage of low-skilled 
domestic workers.   
Differentiating the implicit wage formation (21) with respect to the productivity 
of the outsourced low-skilled labour input relative to the domestic low-skilled labour 
input and low-skilled wage formation gives 
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which can be expressed by using     
0 ) 1 ( )( 1 (
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 as follows  
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Differentiating the implicit wage formation (21) with respect to the factor price 
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where like in equation (11) we have  
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Therefore, lower factor price of outsourcing will have a wage moderating effect on the 
domestic low-skilled wage due to the higher wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour 
demand.  
Moreover, and importantly, equations (23), (25) and (27) jointly with equation 
(15) imply   0 <
dc
dwH  and  0 >
γ d





so that both the lower cost of 
outsourcing, the higher productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input and the 
lower factor price of outsourcing will have positive effects on the domestic high-skilled 
wage.   
In terms of comparative statics of the low-skilled the wage tax, the tax 
exemption and the outside option for unemployment benefit we have the following 
results (see Appendix B) 
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 as  0 > −e bL                                 (28a) 
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                                                       (28c) 
 
According to (28a-28c) the effects of wage tax, tax exemption and outside option on 
low-skilled wage formation are qualitatively the same with and without outsourcing 
because  0




















































. Of course, in the absence of outsourcing the mark-up   21













 is higher than 
in the presence of outsourcing. Moreover, the equations (28a-c) imply jointly with 





  0 >
de





 so that the higher wage tax and the 
higher outside option of low-skilled workers will decrease the wage for the high-skilled 
labour, while the higher tax exemption of low-skilled workers will increase the wage 
for the high-skilled labour.  
Finally, differentiating the implicit wage formation (21) with respect to the 
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which can be expressed as follows    
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because the higher payroll tax will increase the wage elasticity of the low-skilled 
labour, i.e.  for the reason that we have  
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Therefore, the payroll tax will have a wage moderating effect concerning the low-
skilled workers’ wage, because the payroll tax will have a positive effect on the wage 











 because  0 = M .  
The total effect of the payroll tax on the high-skilled workers’ wage is the 
following (see Appendix C) 
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where there is the negative direct effect and the positive indirect effect of the payroll 










We can now summarize our findings in terms of the low-skilled wage formation 
in the presence of outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 3 In the presence of flexible outsourcing 
(a)   the lower cost of outsourcing, the lower factor price of outsourcing  and 
the higher productivity of outsourced production will decrease the wage 
for the low-skilled labour and increase the wage for the high-skilled 
labour, thereby inducing higher wage dispersion, and     
(b) the higher low-skilled wage tax will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled labour and the higher low-
skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled 
labour and will increase the wage for the high-skilled labour, and these 
qualitative results are also similar but higher  in the absence of 
outsourcing, whereas      23
(c) the higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-
skilled and for the high-skilled labour. In the absence of outsourcing, the 
higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the high-skilled 
labour, but has no effect on the wage of low-skilled labour. 
    
According to the first part of this proposition higher outsourcing due to lower 
outsourcing cost, higher productivity of outsourcing input and lower factor price of 
outsourcing is perfectly in line with the fact that the outsourced input is a substitute for 
the low-skilled domestic labour and a complement for the high-skilled domestic labour. 
According to the second part of this proposition the qualitative effects of wage tax and 
tax exemption for the low-skilled workers are not changed by flexible outsourcing. The 
third part of proposition reveals that in the absence of outsourcing the higher payroll tax 
will have no effect on the wage of the low-skilled labour set by the monopoly union, 
but in the presence of flexible outsourcing the monopoly union will cut the wage it sets 
because the own wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour will increase. Finally, the 
higher payroll tax will have a negative effect the wage for the high-skilled in the 
presence of outsourcing, and also in the absence of outsourcing.   
 
 
V.     The Impacts of Low-Skilled Wage Tax Progression  
 
V.1.    Employment Effects 
 
Next we analyze the effect of wage tax progression on wage formation by the 
low-skilled workers and labour demand. We assume that the tax reform will keep the 
relative tax burden per low-skilled worker constant, which means 
                 






L = −                                                                                           (33) 
 
The government can raise the degree of wage tax progression by increasing  L t  and e 
and allowing change in  L w under the condition  0 = dR . Formally we have    24
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and dividing by  L dt  and substituting the RHS of (34) for  L dt de/ gives (see Appendix 
D) 
 



















































L                                                   (35) 
 
 
so that a higher degree of wage tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per 
low-skilled worker constant, will decrease the low skilled wage rate. In the absence of 








 (see Appendix D). 
Finally, we characterize the low-skilled employment effect by raising tax 
progression keeping the relative tax burden per low-skilled worker constant to increase 







































* . Dividing this by  L dt  and substituting the 
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so that higher degree of wage tax progression keeping the relative tax burden per low-
skilled worker constant, will increase the low skilled labour demand. These results (34) 
and (35) also happen in the case of domestic dual labour markets in the presence of 
strategic outsourcing (see Koskela and Poutvaara (2008)) and in the case of 
homogenous domestic labour markets (see Koskela and Schöb (2008)). The qualitative 
effect is similar in the absence of outsourcing.
9  
The total effect concerning direct and indirect effects of changes in low skilled 
wage on the high-skilled labour demand is zero, i.e. 
*
*




w L w dw
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We can now summarize our findings in terms of the low-skilled wage formation 
and labour demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 4 In the presence of flexible outsourcing   
(a) a higher degree of tax progression by raising the wage tax and the tax 
exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the relative burden per 
worker constant will decrease the wage rate and increase labour demand 
of low-skilled workers,  
(b) while it will have no effect on the labour demand of high-skilled workers  
and  
(c) qualitatively similar effects arise in the absence of outsourcing.   
 
                                                 
9        This has been analyzed in the absence of outsourcing e.g. in Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) and in 
Koskela and Schöb (2002).     26
From the perspective of the labour union, an increase in tax progression changes the 
tradeoff between net wage rate and employment. An increasing progression encourages 
the labour union to moderate its wage demand, as the opportunity cost of a given new 
wage increases in terms of additional unemployment increases. 
 
V.2.    Welfare Effects  
 
Now we analyze the welfare effects of low-skilled wage tax progression on the 
low-skilled trade union objective, the high-skilled Cobb-Douglas utility and the firm’s 
profits by still assuming that the tax reform will keep the relative tax burden per low-
skilled worker constant.  
The total effect of changes in tax parameters  L t  and e on the objective function 
of low-skilled workers  N b L b w N b L b e t w t V L L L L L L L L + − = + − + − =
* * * * ) ˆ ( ) ) 1 ((   is                  
* * * * *
* L w e L t dw V de V dt V dV
L L + + = , where  0
*
* =
L w V  according to the envelope theorem. To 


























=  and substituting the RHS of this for de in 
* * * * *
* L w e L t dw V de V dt V dV
L L + + =  gives  
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where 
* * * ) ( L e w V L tL − − =  and 












L . Higher low-skilled 
wage tax progression will decrease the welfare of low-skilled workers by decreasing 
the wage rate. This also happens in the absence of outsourcing.   27
The total effect of changes in tax parameters  L t  and e on the objective function 
of high-skilled workers 
* 1 * * * ) ) 1 (( H e t w t H C U H H H H
μ μ μ + − = =
−   is                  
*
*




w e L t dw
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U de U dt U dU
H L ∂
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+ + = , where  0
* * = = e t U U
L  so that we have  
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where 
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H L  according to (37). Therefore, higher low-skilled wage 
tax progression will increase the welfare of high-skilled workers as a result of higher 
high-skilled wage. This also happens in the absence of outsourcing. 
Finally, the total effect of changes in tax parameters  L t  and e on the firm’s 
profit is 
* * * * *
* L w e L t dw de dt d


























=  and substituting its RHS for de in 
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. We can rewrite (40) as follows  
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(see Appendix E). Therefore, higher low-skilled wage tax progression by decreasing the 
low-skilled wage will increase the firm’s profit and the qualitative result is similar in 
the absence of outsourcing. 
We can now summarize our findings in terms of the welfare effects of low-
skilled tax progression in dual labour markets as follows. 
 
Proposition 5 In the presence of flexible outsourcing   
(a) a higher degree of tax progression, resulting from raising the wage tax 
and the tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the relative 
burden per worker constant, will decrease the welfare of low-skilled 
workers, and  
(b) it will increase the welfare of high-skilled workers as a result of higher 
high-skilled wage, and 
(c) it will increase the profit of firms, and     
(d) the effects of tax progression are qualitatively similar as in (a)-(c)  also in 
the absence of outsourcing.   
 
The welfare effects are driven by the changed labour union incentives, reported in 
Proposition 4.  Increased tax progression reduces the monopoly rent that the labour 
union is able to extract, thus resulting in a lower welfare for the low-skilled union 
members. At the same time, reduced low-skilled wage rate obviously increases the 
profits of firms already in case the firms would not change their employment, and 
further when employment changes are accounted for. The high-skilled workers gain 
due to complementariness in production because higher low-skilled wage tax   29
progression will reduce low-skilled wage, and therefore increasing the total use of low-
skilled labour by the firms. 
 
 
VI.   Conclusions 
 
Most western European countries are characterized by dual labour markets, in 
which wages of some workers are set by labour unions, while other wages are 
determined competitively. In this paper we have studied how the presence of flexible 
outsourcing affects such an economy when the low-skilled workers are unionized and 
the high-skilled workers are employed in competitive labour markets.      
We have shown that in the presence of flexible outsourcing the own wage 
elasticity and the cross wage elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand depend 
negatively on the cost of outsourcing, and the factor price of outsourcing and positively 
on the payroll tax, and  these elasticities are independent of the cost of outsourcing and 
the payroll tax for the high-skilled labour demand. By assuming that the market 
equilibrium for the high-skilled wage follows from the equality of labour demand and 
labour supply and that the high-skilled workers have a Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
we find that the high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-skilled wage and the 
payroll tax, and it is independent of the high-skilled wage tax parameters. The high-
skilled wage depends indirectly on the low-skilled wage change and the productivity of 
outsourced production so that higher outsourcing cost will decrease, while higher 
productivity of low-skilled labour input relative to the domestic labour input will 
increase the high-skilled wage.    
In the presence of flexible outsourcing the lower cost of outsourcing, the lower 
factor price of outsourcing and the higher productivity of outsourced production will 
decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour and increase the wage for the high-skilled 
labour, thereby inducing higher wage dispersion. Moreover, the higher low-skilled 
wage tax will increase the wage for the low-skilled labour and decrease the wage for 
high-skilled labour and the higher low-skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the 
wage for the low-skilled labour and will increase the wage for the high-skilled labour. 
The higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-skilled and    30
high-skilled labour, while in the absence of outsourcing, the higher payroll tax for the 
firms will decrease the wage for the high-skilled labour, but has no effect on the wage 
of low-skilled labour. 
In the presence of flexible outsourcing raising the wage tax and the tax exemption 
for the low-skilled workers to keep the relative burden per worker constant, this higher 
degree of tax progression will decrease the wage rate and increase labour demand of 
low-skilled workers, while it will have no effect on the labour demand of high-skilled 
workers, and this also works in the absence of outsourcing. Concerning the welfare 
effects of low-skilled wage tax progression on the low-skilled trade union objective, the 
high-skilled Cobb-Douglas utility and the firm’s profits, we have shown that this higher 
degree of tax progression will decrease the welfare of low-skilled workers and increase 
the welfare of high-skilled workers as a result of higher high-skilled wage, while it will 
increase the profit of firms by decreasing the low-skilled wage. 
Our framework suggests several avenues for future research. First of all, we 
restricted the analysis of tax reforms to the effects of increasing tax progression for 
low-skilled workers, so that their average tax rate stays the same. An alternative reform 
scenario would be to assume that the government has a given revenue requirement, and 
wage tax parameters are changed so that it is still satisfied. In that case, wage taxation 
would react also to employment changes. One could then also study the effects of a 
reform that would change the wage tax rate and the payroll tax rate. For example, what 
would be effects of increasing the low-skilled wage tax rate and lowering the payroll 
tax, if the change is implemented such that the total government revenue from wage 
taxes and payroll taxes does not change? Moreover, it is important to study what would 
be the optimal linear labour tax structure in the presence of outsourcing? 
Another important research question would be to compare the effects of flexible 
outsourcing, analyzed in this paper, with strategic outsourcing in Koskela and 
Poutvaara (2008). Which regime results in a higher level of outsourcing? How the wage 
rates of the low-skilled and high-skilled workers differ? Which type of outsourcing 
results in more low-skilled unemployment? What are the effects on the welfare of 
different skill types and on the profit rates? Due to complexities involved, it appears 
that such an analysis would call for a computational general equilibrium model,   31
allowing calculating the economic equilibrium in the two scenarios. Doing this is left 
for future research. 
Finally, our research calls for additional empirical work. Establishing how 
common strategic and flexible outsourcing are in various industries, combined with a 
theoretical analysis that would compare their economic effects, would allow to estimate 
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Appendix A: Optimal Low-Skilled Labour Demand 
 
Substituting the RHS of (4) for H  into (3b) gives  
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(A3) and (5) in its turn give (6). QED. 
 
Appendix B: Optimal Wage Setting under Progressive Wage Taxation 
and Proportional Payroll Taxation 
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Using (B2) and (B3) gives  0
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equation (21) because   
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which gives (28a). Of course, the equations (28b) and (28c) can be derived in the 
similar way. QED. 
 
Appendix C: The total effect of the payroll tax on the high-skilled 
workers’ wage  
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Appendix D: Tax Progression and Low-Skilled Labour Demand 
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 in (35) we obtain that it is negative, i.e.     
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Appendix E: Tax Progression and Welfare Effect of Firms  
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equation (E1) can be expressed as 
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